Showing posts with label Security Policies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Security Policies. Show all posts

Thursday, July 2, 2015

Uses of E-mail

Anonymity allowed
Exception: if it violates laws or other policies
Can’t interfere with others’ use of e-mail
No spam, letter bombs, e-mailed worms, etc.
Personal e-mail allowed within limits
Cannot interfere with university business

Such e-mail may be a “university record” subject to disclosure

Security of E-mail
University can read e-mail
Won’t go out of its way to do so
Allowed for legitimate business purposes
Allowed to keep e-mail robust, reliable
Archiving and retention allowed
May be able to recover e-mail from end system (backed up, for example)

Implementation

Adds campus-specific requirements and procedures
Example: “incidental personal use” not allowed if it benefits a non-university organization
Allows implementation to take into account differences between campuses, such as self-governance by Academic Senate
Procedures for inspecting, monitoring, disclosing e-mail contents
Backups


Tuesday, June 30, 2015

Mechanisms

Entity or procedure that enforces some part of the security policy
Access controls (like bits to prevent someone from reading a homework file)

Disallowing people from bringing CDs and floppy disks into a computer facility to control what is placed on systems
Example English Policy
Computer security policy for academic institution
Institution has multiple campuses, administered from central office
Each campus has its own administration, and unique aspects and needs
Authorized Use Policy
Electronic Mail Policy

Authorized Use Policy
Intended for one campus (Davis) only
Goals of campus computing
Underlying intent
Procedural enforcement mechanisms
Warnings
Denial of computer access
Disciplinary action up to and including expulsion
Written informally, aimed at user community
Electronic Mail Policy
Systemwide, not just one campus
Three parts
Summary
Full policy
Interpretation at the campus

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Trust

Administrator installs patch
1.Trusts patch came from vendor, not tampered with in transit
2.Trusts vendor tested patch thoroughly
3.Trusts vendor’s test environment corresponds to local environment

4.Trusts patch is installed correctly
Trust in Formal Verification
Gives formal mathematical proof that given input i, program P produces output o as specified
Suppose a security-related program S formally verified to work with operating system O
What are the assumptions?
Trust in Formal Methods
1.Proof has no errors
Bugs in automated theorem provers
2.Preconditions hold in environment in which S is to be used
3.S transformed into executable S¢ whose actions follow source code
Compiler bugs, linker/loader/library problems
4.Hardware executes S¢ as intended
Hardware bugs (Pentium f00f bug, for example)

Saturday, June 27, 2015

Policy Models

Abstract description of a policy or class of policies
Focus on points of interest in policies
Security levels in multilevel security models
Separation of duty in Clark-Wilson model

Conflict of interest in Chinese Wall model
Types of Security Policies
Military (governmental) security policy
Policy primarily protecting confidentiality
Commercial security policy
Policy primarily protecting integrity
Confidentiality policy
Policy protecting only confidentiality
Integrity policy
Policy protecting only integrity

Integrity and Transactions
Begin in consistent state
“Consistent” defined by specification
Perform series of actions (transaction)
Actions cannot be interrupted
If actions complete, system in consistent state
If actions do not complete, system reverts to beginning (consistent) state

Friday, June 26, 2015

Security Policies

Policy partitions system states into:
Authorized (secure)
These are states the system can enter
Unauthorized (nonsecure)
If the system enters any of these states, it’s a security violation
Secure system
Starts in authorized state

Never enters unauthorized state

Confidentiality

X set of entities, I information
I has confidentiality property with respect to X if no x ÃŽ X can obtain information from I
I can be disclosed to others
Example:
X set of students
I final exam answer key
I is confidential with respect to X if students cannot obtain final exam answer key