Showing posts with label Computer Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Computer Security. Show all posts

Thursday, July 2, 2015

Uses of E-mail

Anonymity allowed
Exception: if it violates laws or other policies
Can’t interfere with others’ use of e-mail
No spam, letter bombs, e-mailed worms, etc.
Personal e-mail allowed within limits
Cannot interfere with university business

Such e-mail may be a “university record” subject to disclosure

Security of E-mail
University can read e-mail
Won’t go out of its way to do so
Allowed for legitimate business purposes
Allowed to keep e-mail robust, reliable
Archiving and retention allowed
May be able to recover e-mail from end system (backed up, for example)

Implementation

Adds campus-specific requirements and procedures
Example: “incidental personal use” not allowed if it benefits a non-university organization
Allows implementation to take into account differences between campuses, such as self-governance by Academic Senate
Procedures for inspecting, monitoring, disclosing e-mail contents
Backups


Wednesday, July 1, 2015

Summary

Warns that electronic mail not private
Can be read during normal system administration
Can be forged, altered, and forwarded
Unusual because the policy alerts users to the threats

Usually, policies say how to prevent problems, but do not define the threats
What users should and should not do
Think before you send
Be courteous, respectful of others
Don’t nterfere with others’ use of email
Personal use okay, provided overhead minimal
Who it applies to
Problem is UC is quasi-governmental, so is bound by rules that private companies may not be
Educational mission also affects application
Full Policy
Context
Does not apply to Dept. of Energy labs run by the university
Does not apply to printed copies of email
Other policies apply here
E-mail, infrastructure are university property
Principles of academic freedom, freedom of speech apply
Access without user’s permission requires approval of vice chancellor of campus or vice president of UC
If infeasible, must get permission retroactively


Tuesday, June 30, 2015

Mechanisms

Entity or procedure that enforces some part of the security policy
Access controls (like bits to prevent someone from reading a homework file)

Disallowing people from bringing CDs and floppy disks into a computer facility to control what is placed on systems
Example English Policy
Computer security policy for academic institution
Institution has multiple campuses, administered from central office
Each campus has its own administration, and unique aspects and needs
Authorized Use Policy
Electronic Mail Policy

Authorized Use Policy
Intended for one campus (Davis) only
Goals of campus computing
Underlying intent
Procedural enforcement mechanisms
Warnings
Denial of computer access
Disciplinary action up to and including expulsion
Written informally, aimed at user community
Electronic Mail Policy
Systemwide, not just one campus
Three parts
Summary
Full policy
Interpretation at the campus

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Trust

Administrator installs patch
1.Trusts patch came from vendor, not tampered with in transit
2.Trusts vendor tested patch thoroughly
3.Trusts vendor’s test environment corresponds to local environment

4.Trusts patch is installed correctly
Trust in Formal Verification
Gives formal mathematical proof that given input i, program P produces output o as specified
Suppose a security-related program S formally verified to work with operating system O
What are the assumptions?
Trust in Formal Methods
1.Proof has no errors
Bugs in automated theorem provers
2.Preconditions hold in environment in which S is to be used
3.S transformed into executable S¢ whose actions follow source code
Compiler bugs, linker/loader/library problems
4.Hardware executes S¢ as intended
Hardware bugs (Pentium f00f bug, for example)

Friday, June 26, 2015

Security Policies

Policy partitions system states into:
Authorized (secure)
These are states the system can enter
Unauthorized (nonsecure)
If the system enters any of these states, it’s a security violation
Secure system
Starts in authorized state

Never enters unauthorized state

Confidentiality

X set of entities, I information
I has confidentiality property with respect to X if no x ÃŽ X can obtain information from I
I can be disclosed to others
Example:
X set of students
I final exam answer key
I is confidential with respect to X if students cannot obtain final exam answer key

Thursday, June 25, 2015

Computer Security

Trust and Assumptions
Underlie all aspects of security
Policies
Unambiguously partition system states
Correctly capture security requirements
Mechanisms
Assumed to enforce policy

Support mechanisms work correctly

Assurance
Specification
Requirements analysis
Statement of desired functionality
Design
How system will meet specification
Implementation
Programs/systems that carry out design

Wednesday, June 24, 2015

Computer Security

Basic Components

Confidentiality
Keeping data and resources hidden
Integrity
Data integrity (integrity)
Origin integrity (authentication)
Availability

Enabling access to data and resources
Classes of Threats
Disclosure
Snooping
Deception
Modification, spoofing, repudiation of origin, denial of receipt
Disruption
Modification
Usurpation
Modification, spoofing, delay, denial of service